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INQUIRING INTO THE REAL: A REALIST PHENOMENOLOGICAL
APPROACH
John M. Budd,1 Heather Hill,2 and Brooke Shannon3
The need for postpositivist or antipositivist methods in the social sciences, including
library and information science, is well documented. A promising alternative syn-
thesizes critical realism and phenomenology. This method embraces ontological
reality in all things, including human and social action. The ontology underlying
the realist phenomenological approach recognizes, following Bhaskar, intransitive
and transitive objects of knowledge (mind-independent reality and individual and
social perceptions of that reality). The synthesis encompasses some particular el-
ements, including perceptions of parts and wholes, the reconciliation of presence
and absence, and the essential character of intentionality. Withholding judgment
(exercising a particular kind of skepticism) enables inquirers to delve into the
historicity and background of action. Potential uses of the method are manifold;
some specifics are examined here.
The literatures of almost all of the social sciences include authoritative
pronouncements that positivism has long since met its demise as a method.
Library and information science (LIS), too, includes its share of claims.
Even positivism’s adherents have admitted to its failures. In spite of the
obituaries, there is some reason to believe that a positivistic spirit remains
in the social sciences. No one speaks any longer of methodological monism
and the reconciliation of synthesis and analysis, but applications betray a
false realism in inquiry. In fact, “reification” would be another word for
the instances of the positivistic method. In a recent work, Stephen T. Ziliak
and Deidre N. McCloskey [1] carefully examine the application of statistical
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analyses in studies conducted in the field of economics. Their examination
is informed by their entirely correct conjecture that statistical significance
has, to a considerable extent, become a surrogate for reasoning. Statistical
significance, frequently reported as t-, F-, or Z-values, do not signal the
substance of relationships between things or the strengths or causal links
of these relationships. Ziliak and McCloskey write, “What, a scientist should
ask, are the social or personal human purposes activated by [a] belief?
What does the belief lead to?” [1, p. 11]. The questions deserve attention
in LIS.
An article in the library literature illustrates what Ziliak and McCloskey
are speaking of. Frank R. Allen and Mark Dickie employ statistical signif-
icance to design a formula for academic library funding. They state, “The
purpose of this study is to illustrate a model in which funding of an aca-
demic library depends on institutional characteristics” [2, p. 173]. Their
intent is to model a funding strategy based on factors external to the library.
On the face of it, the notion appears to have potential relevance in higher
education fiscal affairs. The variables—number of undergraduate students,
number of graduate students, number of PhDs awarded, number of doc-
toral fields, and number of faculty—should be considered in any general
funding model. There are some factors that those variables cannot account
for, though, such as the research intensity of the faculty, teaching expec-
tations of faculty (which affect research intensity), research funding at-
tracted, and specifics of the institution’s mission (translated into opera-
tional imperatives and priorities). In short, the authors do not examine
institutional and individual intentionalities that can affect the need for
resources. The authors also quantify such variables as governance (private
p 1 and public p 0), which is in no way legitimate. The governance
variables are included in the regression analyses. The authors also trans-
form the data to a logarithmic scale, admitting that “the impact on cost
of adding the 90th Ph.D. program is probably less than the impact on cost
of adding the 20th” [2, p. 173]. The rationale for the presumption is not
stated, but cost is not simply a matter of order (which things comes first).
It depends on the nature of the program itself. (In other words, it is
problematic to assume that all doctoral programs are the same—in objects
of study, resources required, potential for the recruitment of students, and
other things.) They present actual and model expenditure means graph-
ically, so that little year-to-year difference is apparent. If that is indeed the
finding of this study, it seems that the modeling effort yields no benefit.
That said, Allen and Dickie also present data for individual members of
the Association of Research Libraries. Here the variance is enormous; the
University of California, Berkeley, spent about 119 percent more than the
model predicted, while Boston University spent 38 percent less than pre-
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dicted. It is not simply that this analysis has no utility; it demonstrates the
need for a different way of inquiring into problems in our field.
In another vein, quite a bit of inquiry in LIS does reject the positivistic
bent. It tends to rely more on what could be called a hermeneutic construct.
Studies in this realm are very difficult to categorize and assess, because
uses of hermeneutic or interpretive methods vary greatly in conception
and use. On the one hand, Ian Cornelius claims, “Hermeneutics denies
the existence of objective facts in the humanities and the social sciences
and claims that in gaining understanding of our situation, of one another,
and of ‘foreign’ societies, we are constantly in dialogue and our position
becomes transformed by the process of understanding” [3, pp. 18–19]. On
the other hand, some hermeneutical studies attempt to identify intersub-
jective conceptions that can reach some ontological common ground. Cor-
nelius’s idea denies ontology and, in so doing, creates serious problems
for epistemology. Sometimes explicit, sometimes naive, the antiontology
stance is indicative of the neopragmatism articulated by Richard Rorty and
others. Not all advocates of a hermeneutic element in LIS inquiry take
extreme positions. Joacim Hansson, for one, urges that “the creation of
meaning through interpretation of social action and relations can be seen
as one of the main prerogatives of contemporary scientific research” [4,
p. 111].
Library and information science needs ways to seek and find meaningful
and substantive answers to questions that matter. The following is an at-
tempt to forge such a path. As is true of almost all useful methods, there
are theoretical and practical sides to method. A different way to inquire
is proposed here. It is grounded in realism and in a recognition of on-
tological necessity. It does not eschew interpretation, though this realist
phenomenological approach is amenable to quantitative and qualitative
(writ large) analyses, because the method underlying the approach in-
cludes a set of conceptual imperatives that guide the inquiry itself. The
details of these imperatives, drawn from two foundations, are presented
here.
Foundation 1
The first foundation of the proposed approach is critical realism, as artic-
ulated by Roy Bhaskar in a number of works. Bhaskar developed his ideas
over many years; this foundation draws from the totality of his work to
conceive of the first part of a viable method. One basic tenet of Bhaskar’s
critical realism is that “the world is constituted by the objects of actual
(and, sometimes, possible) experiences” [5, p. 6]. A very attractive part of
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Bhaskar’s thought is his understanding of human and social action as
“open.” He rejects the Humean tradition of asserting laws that operate in
closed systems. “This has the consequence that neither the experimental
establishment nor the practical application of our knowledge in open sys-
tems can be situated. Once we allow for open systems then laws can only
be universal if they are interpreted in a non-empirical (trans-factual) way”
[5, p. 14]. The rejection of the closed-system requirement necessitates
rejection of simplistic empiricism that adheres to narrow definitions of
facts. Examination of the ways people ask questions, seek for information,
and evaluate what they have found requires the kind of openness Bhaskar
advocates.
The openness carries implications for inquiry and method. Human ac-
tion—people seeking and evaluating information, people seeking knowl-
edge, work within scholarly disciplines, interactions in organizations—can-
not be restrictively examined according to superficial characteristics. The
action itself has cognitive, intellective, linguistic, communicative, and other
elements. The openness, however, does not render human action and the
elements that constitute it less real. That is, there is an ontology of cog-
nition, communication, and so forth. The reality of human action cannot
be reduced to stimuli and responses, solely physical reactions, or uncon-
scious behavior. Seeking information, for example, is the instantiation of
complex self, other (that is, other persons), or externally influenced fac-
tors. A teacher’s assignment is real and has effects on what students do.
What students do, though, is also affected by what they already know,
including the difficult to assess “known-unknown.” The decisions and
choices made by the students are not necessarily subject to a firm set of
laws, and there is an explicable reason for resistance to formulation. As
Bhaskar writes, “Human action is characterized by the striking phenom-
enon of intentionality. This seems to depend upon the feature that persons
are material things with a degree of neurophysiological complexity which
enables them not just, like other higher-order animals, to initiate changes
in a purposeful way, to monitor and control their performances, but to
monitor the monitoring of these performances and to be capable of a
commentary upon them” [6, p. 35].
Intentionality does not signify license. A person acting intentionally has
considerable freedom but also acts according to some constraints. The
rules of grammar constrain speech, but they by no means determine it.
Likewise, rules of logic constrain formal inquiry, but the application of the
rules can only occur in certain circumstances. An argument is a formal
structure, but that structure does not determine the premise that a par-
ticular individual will posit at a given time. One of the forces at work at
all times in human and social action is history. History, in this sense, can
be big or little (i.e., it can entail events that affect epochs and nations or
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events in the lives of individuals). The influence can result from the col-
lective and shared history of a group (the kind of history that is usually
studied) or the history of a person, a family, or an organization.
Not only are ideas in conflict, histories are also at odds with one another.
Studies of such things as technical reporting systems will be insufficient;
studies of the rhetoric of demand and resistance will be insufficient (al-
though both can contribute to inquiry). Investigations can be conducted
in many venues, including actions that take place within institutions and
organizations in general (including schools, colleges and universities, gov-
ernment agencies, businesses, and libraries). In short, intentionality is not
solipsistic; it exists and operates in contexts that both vary and are con-
structed (the contexts are almost innumerable, but each has its own struc-
ture and form).
Contexts tend to be social (although individualistic context is not im-
possible). Society, in critical realism, is not an object, separate from people,
but neither do people at a particular point in time make society. It both
preexists the individuals who live right now (to some extent society is
“given” to a person at a point in time) and is shaped by those individuals
contemporaneously. Acceptance of this dynamic is important to method;
society carries its own ontological meaning—not completely separate from
individuals, but with distinctions. For one thing, an individual’s intention-
ality, even if it is as radical as intending transformation of society, may have
little impact on social reality. The reason is one of scope and one of kind.
Society is composed of the many, each acting intentionally and (although
at many times in some substantive purposive agreement) not entirely in
concert. Further, society is human and historical; it is a product of what
happens now, what has happened, and what future is intended. For these
reasons no method that allows, much less embodies, philosophical atomism
(the premise that independent entities interact in specified ways, with
specified outcomes, as proposed by David Hume) can have efficacy. Bhas-
kar’s criticism of Hume is centered on the reduction to the individual qua
individual (that is, the individual as fully representing society and vice
versa). The ontological component of this piece of the foundation has
apparent applicability to the study and practice of organizing and classi-
fying information.
The critical realist foundation that Bhaskar’s thought provides encom-
passes some essential element of the complete method described here.
For one thing, he distinguishes between two distinct objects of knowledge.
One he calls “intransitive objects,” which are independent of our existence;
these are generally material objects or occurrences. For example, a realist
believes that the thing we call granite exists whether we have knowledge
of it (or even awareness of it) or not. The other object of knowledge is
what Bhaskar calls “transitive objects,” which “are Aristotelian material
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causes. They are the raw materials of science—the artificial objects fash-
ioned into items of knowledge by the science of the day” [5, p. 21]. Bhaskar
says that we cannot imagine a science without transitive objects of knowl-
edge. His claim is based on the historical nature of human knowledge; as
he says, it would have been very difficult for William Harvey, working in
the seventeenth century, to conceive of the circulation of blood if he had
not been aware of the existence of hydraulic pumps [5, pp. 22–23]. From
the ontological point of view, the world itself is constituted of transitive
and intransitive objects. These two objects of knowledge lead Bhaskar to
maintain that his program entails ontological realism and epistemological
relativism. His description of epistemological relativism, though, indicates
that “epistemological fallibilism” would be a more accurate term.
Method relies on the historical, transitive element. For anyone to be
able to ask a new question, one must be cognizant of previous questions
and their answers. Method also relies on the ontic (real) structure that
defines the world. The structural contribution of Bhaskar is very complex
but vital to method. He designs what he calls “four-planar social being”
[7, p. 160]. The model represents flow, not static being, so the study of
human action, interaction with informing objects, seeking knowledge, com-
municating informatively, and other acts can be studied as flows. The flows,
though, have structure, a structure that accommodates the ontic, the com-
municative, and the interpretive. The model also serves to illustrate that
there are both enabling and constraining forces and that individuals/
society are capable of both the simple reproduction of structures and
actions and transforming those structures and actions. The complexity of
the social cube holds a great deal of meaning for method. Institutions may
be formal entities that, in many cases, preexist the individual, but the
involvement of people (praxis) is dynamic. The dynamic participation
affects institutions and structures, albeit not always directly or immediately.
David Harvey recapitulates the complex interinvolvement of the four
planes: “The Community is both the ever-present condition (material
cause) and the continually reproduced outcome of self-cultivation (effi-
cient cause), just as self-cultivation is both the conscious production of self
and the reproduction of the communal conditions of future self-repro-
duction” [8, p. 188]. In our field Marianne Wikgren describes the impor-
tance of Bhaskar’s contribution: “A distinctive feature of a realist philos-
ophy is that ontology (the theory of being, which has strong implications
for the conceptions of reality) is seen as distinct from epistemology (the
theory of knowledge), which means that scientific theorizing is based on
the assumption that there exists a mind-independent reality. In this respect
realism differs from empiricism (the view that knowledge derives from
experience of the world), and also from idealism (positing thought and
language over matter)” [9, p. 12].
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One particular instance where critical realism can offer analytical assis-
tance is with an element of cognition (mostly transcended in the natural
sciences but persistent in the social sciences). There is sufficient evidence
that human minds do indeed process information in certain ways. The
displaced information-processing model posited simplistic linear routes
within the brain that resulted in the aggregation and assimilation of in-
formation. The former notion of information processing is evident in a
statement by Victor Rosenberg (although he explicitly recognized that
there are limitations to the received view): “There is no doubt that a large
portion of human behavior associated with information is deterministic,
even computer-like” [10, p. 264]. Not all information science thinking and
practice has limited itself to the naive cognitive stance. For example, in
reviewing work on information processing, Peter Ingwersen suggested that
“the shift into a situational context assumes consideration of intentionality
and processes of interpretation” [11, p. 13]. While Ingwersen tried to
assimilate (among other things) perception and interpretation into infor-
mation processing and questioned the abilities of computers to capture
the unpredictable nature of human cognition and action, he still felt
obliged to acknowledge algorithmic processing. At this time the perspective
of Ingwersen is the more common, but Rosenberg’s determinism has not
disappeared.
Foundation 2
The second foundational anchor of this proposed method is evident from
the title of this article. Phenomenology, together with critical realism, pro-
vides the basis for rigorous, structured inquiry in LIS and beyond. The
most concise definition of phenomenology is offered by Robert Sokolowski:
“Phenomenology is the study of human experience and of the way things
present themselves to us in and through such experience” [12, p. 2]. That
definition requires expansion, though. Experience not only includes, but
is necessarily connected to, perception. The experience-perception aspect
of being can be examined in two fundamental ways: (1) as an ideal of
being, to which human action should be directed so that life can be most
fully understood, and (2) as the lived experience of people, examined as
people experience and perceive, without a priori imposition or regulation.
Method, as discussed here, must adopt the second mode of examination,
but it must also adopt the first as a normative and realist direction for
experience. The examination, to be complete, has to reconcile parts and
wholes—of experience and of reality itself. It must explore presence and
absence. It must also apply the lens of intentionality to the study of ex-
perience. Such elements can be applied to conceptions of relevance. Even
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here one can discern some common ground between phenomenology and
critical realism; the complementarities are what lend credence to this pro-
posed method.
Just as critical realism is more than Bhaskar’s idea, so too is phenom-
enology more than Edmund Husserl’s idea. Husserl’s program of phe-
nomenology does form the heart of this second foundation, though. Hus-
serl, as does Bhaskar, places ontological reality front and center and, in
keeping with Bhaskar, the ontological reality is not bound or constrained
by positivistic conceptions: “It is not that that real sensory world is ‘recast’
or denied, but that an absurd interpretation of the same, which indeed
contradicts its own mentally clarified meaning, is set aside. It springs from
making the world absolute in a philosophical sense, which is wholly foreign
to the way we naturally look upon the world” [13, p. 153]. There is thus
a burden on the inquirer to explore reality as it is. The inquirer must
reflect on the world as it is plus on our own history in order to reach a
complete understanding [13, pp. 198, 200]. The transcendental aspect of
Husserl’s phenomenology consists of reflecting on both the object per-
ceived and the perceiver’s consciousness of the object [13, p. 201]. Phe-
nomenological intentionality is defined, in part, by such reflection: “It is
intentionality which characterizes consciousness in the pregnant sense of
the term, and justifies us in describing the whole stream of experience as
at once a stream of consciousness and unity of one consciousness” [13, p.
222].
Another affinity that phenomenology has with critical realism is negation
of the phenomenalist reduction of everything to sense experience. Reality
is both more than, and different from, simple sensory experience. Owen
Flanagan places the extension of reality within a rejection of imperialistic
scientific materialism: “Science has no language to express ‘oughts,’ unless
perhaps they are the ‘oughts’ of engineering or those of technological
practice. . . . Furthermore, if this and many other moral truths are know-
able, then there is knowledge that is not scientific” [14, p. 72]. The search
for knowledge requires that there be a richer grounding, one that embraces
intentionality, perception, and reflection. In phenomenology intentional
structure is important; Bhaskar’s graphic is illustrative of phenomenology,
as well as of critical realism. Situation (including context) contributes to
the structure. The structure, for phenomenology, is a vital component of
lebenswelt, or lifeworld. In much qualitative research lifeworld is somewhat
misconstrued as an individual’s lived experience. Lived experience is a
component, but lifeworld is the ontological reality in which one experi-
ences life. It is also the complexity of perception and the reflection on
experience and perception. Phenomenological analysis is not possible un-
less the totality of lifeworld is examined. The totality of lifeworld entails
implicit skepticism; it is no mere sensation but also the judgment of ex-
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perience. Husserl was clear in later works that this kind of skepticism is
necessary—in living and in inquiry into the ways people live lives. Accu-
sations of strong idealism in Husserl’s phenomenology are not warranted.
In his last work Husserl [15] elaborated on the concept and practice of
epoche¯, which is vital to this method. Sokolowski offers a useful explanation
of epoche¯: “Reduction, with the Latin root re-ducere, is a leading back, a
withholding or a withdrawal. When we enter into this new viewpoint, we
suspend the intentionalities we now contemplate” [12, p. 49]. In employing
epoche¯ as part of a method, a first step is the recognition and acceptance
that epoche¯ does not transform the general actions that are observed (for
example, information seeking as a phenomenon). The reason why the
epoche¯ as examination does not intrude on general actions is that the re-
duction is a quest for truth on the subjective terms of the actors. It asks
why and seeks to find truth-in-itself. This quest is not often recognized in
examination of information seeking or reference transactions, but it could
lead to our understanding of the interpretive processes that accompany
such actions. Truth-in-itself is in keeping with the epistemological fallibilism
of critical realism. The investigation, as a study of subjective consciousness,
aims to delve deeper than the superficial evidence of action, to the con-
sciousness itself—insofar as that is possible. Husserl says, “We perform the
epoche¯—we who are philosophizing in a new way—as a transformation of
the attitude which precedes it not accidentally but essentially, namely, the
attitude of natural human existence which, in its total historicity, in life
and science, was never before interrupted” [15, p. 151].
Beyond general actions, epoche¯ is not separate from actors. An understand-
ing of consciousness cannot be accomplished unless consciousness is en-
gaged. Again, this element of phenomenology demonstrates not idealism
but realism. Husserl explains the methodological implications of epoche¯ ; his
words suffice to elucidate its application: “In reciprocal understanding, my
experiences and experiential acquisitions enter into contact with those of
others, . . . and here again, for the most part, intersubjective harmony of
validity occurs, [establishing what is] ‘normal’ in respect to particular de-
tails, and thus an intersubjective unity also comes about in the multiplicity
of validities and of what is valid through them . . . but then, whether it
is unspoken and even unnoticed, or is expressed through discussion and
criticism, a unification is brought about or at least is certain in advance
as possibly attainable by everyone” [15, p. 163].
Both phenomenology and critical realism rely on apprehension of the
relationship of parts and wholes. The examination of ontological being
depends on the apprehension. In fact, it is through such apprehension
that the ontology can be appreciated. Anticipating a whole is actually im-
plicit in much of LIS inquiry—finding information, growth of knowledge,
even organizational studies of libraries and other agencies. Action, for
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example, is composed of parts; one who seeks information has in mind
elements of a question, facets of a search, components of evaluation, and
so forth. Likewise, knowledge has parts. The marrying of phenomenology
and critical realism enables an inquirer to examine the elements of ex-
perience and action that are constitutive parts of a whole, that is, which
parts are not independent of the whole but rather define the whole. In
order to achieve the end of epoche¯, the entirety of action and subjective
consciousness should be investigated. Conclusions are withheld until such
an analysis can be conducted. The evidence Husserl speaks of is, “in an
extremely broad sense, an ‘experiencing’ of something that is, and is thus;
it is precisely a mental seeing of something itself” [16, p. 12]. The evidence
that is accepted is that which withstands criticism and questioning.
Further, both phenomenology and critical realism depend on the rec-
onciliation of presence and absence. The reconciliation can be expressed
deceptively simply: presence and absence are constitutive parts of a whole.
The expression may not be very satisfying, though, so some explication
follows. First, let us consider Sokolowski’s description of absence: “The
absences that surround the human condition are of different kinds. Some
things are absent because they are future, others because they are con-
temporary but far away, others because they are forgotten, others because
they are concealed or secret, and still others because they are beyond our
comprehension and yet are given to us as such: we can know that this is
something we do not understand” [12, p. 37]. If we place this into an
information-seeking example, it can be seen clearly that the seeker’s ques-
tion inevitably includes absence; it is intended to, at the very least, fill in
gaps in both awareness and knowledge and to give further shape to some-
thing that already exists in the mind. In the search for knowledge, one is
taking the intentionality further; the searcher is open to being reshaped
by what is discovered. The reshaping depends on the presence of some-
thing, though. This explication is rather simplistic, but it illustrates the
fodder for epoche¯ as a component of this method.
Building upon the Foundations
There are some general aspects of the method that can have universal
application and some specific kinds of questions to which the method can
be applied. Let us begin with the general. Both of the foundations insist
upon inquiry in an open world; closed systems cannot be representations
of human and social action. In particular, humans (as actors) interact with
one another and with the world. These interactions imply ontology; there
is reality to dealings with other people and with the world. As ontological
entities, the interactions are thus analyzable, as the thinking, cognizing,
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and affect that are parts of the reality are also open to examination; no
mere behavioristic inquiry is likely to be fruitful. A fundamental human
act, becoming informed about something, is most effectively examined
according to the phenomenological realist approach. Historicity is a com-
ponent of being informed in several ways: each of us has a history (shared
to varying, possibly widely varying, degrees) that shapes how we initiate
and proceed throughout an event that can be informative; informative
objects have histories that are quite possibly simultaneously epistemolog-
ically, ideologically, traditionally, and organizationally shaped; the locus of
informing has its history, be it the collective history of libraries (and the
individual history of a library), the history that has contributed to the state
of a discipline, and the personal history that can affect acceptance or
rejection of such things as testimony. The histories are real and deep, and
they can be subjected to the phenomenological attitude.
The phenomenological attitude of an inquirer inheres in the entirety
of the phenomenological realist approach, although critical realism does
not refer to it explicitly. Its counterpoint is the natural attitude, which
characterizes most of human thought and action. The natural attitude also
characterizes much philosophy and social science research. It is intentional,
so there is no question of dismissing or diminishing it as necessary to a
lifeworld. Husserl explains: “within the natural attitude . . . the lifeworld
could have become the subject matter of a science of its own, an ontology
of the lifeworld purely as experiential world” [15, p. 173]. Within the
natural attitude one tends not to reflect upon these intentionalities,
though; they are taken as givens. A student assigned to write a paper on
a particular topic, for example, may leave much unexamined—the possible
reasons (intentionalities) for the teacher making that assignment, the lo-
cation of the assignment within the rest of the course content, the meaning
of the assignment’s outcome beyond schooling, and other things. The
phenomenological realist approach addresses the ego cogito but with special
reference to the transcendental reflection on the objects (including the
self and other selves) of thought. The phenomenological attitude is nec-
essary to that reflection. It is within the phenomenological attitude that
epoche¯ can take place. Examination of what lies beneath and beyond, in-
cluding beliefs, requires the reflection that transcends the natural attitude.
Some particular examples of application may help elucidate the impor-
tance of this method. If we accept that more and more substantive inquiry
is needed into school libraries and librarianship, we can see the efficacy
of the phenomenological realist approach. A potential aspect of investi-
gation may entail libraries’ impact on the reading abilities of students.
Libraries may be presumed to be sites of reading, but we may not fully
understand school libraries’ contributions to students’ reading. An element
of the examination—of a specific school library or school libraries in gen-
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eral—is the history of libraries’ and librarianship’s participation in the
enhancement of reading ability. That is, one cannot start from the present
time without investigating the activeness or passivity of the library and
librarian. That history has helped to shape the present state. Likewise, the
inquirer will have to investigate the classroom teachers’ inclusion (or ex-
clusion) of the library and librarian in the teaching of reading. The actions
of the students will be informed by both of these immanent states; the
students’ self-reflections can be facilitated or retarded by the nature of the
state. To explain students’ reflection, we can consider Dan Zahavi’s ob-
servation: “Whereas the world can only appear for a subject, subjectivity
does not need the world in order to be. The world, and more generally,
every type of transcendence, is relative insofar as the condition for its
appearance lies outside itself, namely, in the subject. In contrast the subject,
the immanence, is absolute and autonomous since its manifestation only
depends on itself” [17, p. 48]. Students, as subjects, can examine their
own subjectivity and the effects of the world (learning to read in the rich
sense of finding meaning in what is written).
One application of the approach described here can provide a more
concrete explanation of its viability. A study was conducted in the spring
2008 semester. Students in a library science course were asked to search
for items of potential relevance (and to identify three such items) to a
particular topic—“freedom of speech and the First Amendment.” There
were thirty student responses to the task. A conclusion that can be drawn
from the responses is that it is possible for documents to embody some
pragmatic aspect of reality (ten listed some common works in their search
results). That is, the documents as intentionally created by their authors
have syntactic and semantic characteristics that are sufficiently real that a
person can retrieve them by means of a search. Further, the documents
can be deemed by the searcher as relevant to the question that contributed
to the search. That is, the students could apply epoche¯ and apply it in some
consistent ways that lead to some shared conclusions. This finding does
not contradict any claim that there is more to any document than the
intentional structures; it is simply that the intentional structures are suf-
ficiently real as to be sharable. Intentionality that is manifest through syn-
tactic and semantic systems, while not extramental, is a real part of human
action. The finding supports a notion that the immanent experiences that
humans have include a commonality that is discernible.
The discernment of meaning is possible, in part, because of an onto-
logical character of intentional human communication. The responses to
the task posed to the students demonstrate an additional bit of evidence
for the ontology. As might be expected by anyone who has taught a course
component on searching for information, students are likely, when the
topic is imposed upon them, to use the imposed terms as part of the search.
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The respondents in this project did just that but only to a limited degree.
The very nature of immanent and transcendent experiences tends to re-
quire taking into account the particular intentional identifications applied
by the respondents. The processes of perceiving and reflecting entail ap-
plying universal concepts to particular instances of the concepts, especially
in order to reflect upon the uniqueness of the instances. Insight into an
essence—“eidetic intuition” in Husserlian phenomenology—is not men-
tioned by Bhaskar, but it is implicit in his criticism of the objectivist strain
in the social sciences. Sokolowski explains the stages that lead to eidetic
intuition:
1. On the first level, we experience a number of things and find sim-
ilarities among them.
2. On the second level, . . . a kind of identity synthesis now occurs in
which we recognize not just similars, but the very same, a “one in
many.”
3. In our third and final stage, we strive to reach a feature that it would
be inconceivable for things to be without [12, pp. 177–78].
When the respondents reported on the reasons for mentioning the three
specific items they did, the reporting demonstrates the two characteristics
of a single reality. One student searched, in particular, for something on
the controversy surrounding the Danish cartoons that satirized Islam. The
reasoning employed by the student is apparent in the brief report:
I chose the Malek article [from the Columbia Journalism Review] because it was
interesting to hear from the source (Flemming Rose is the culture editor at Jyllands-
Posten, who solicited the cartoons about Muhammed) about a notable free speech
issue. Obviously, the Danes don’t work under our First Amendment, but they do
have their own guarantees of free speech, and Rose wanted to make a point about
free speech by publishing something he knew would be inflammatory. I think it’s
worthwhile for librarians to reflect on the fact that free speech issues can sometimes
be life or death issues.
This report demonstrates something that Bhaskar emphasizes—the social
aspect of individual informing. This aspect, he says, embodies, of necessity,
a dialectic. The basics of the dialectic entail recursive interaction between
society and the individual. The interaction of society is more complicated
than the model, but Bhaskar draws it as a means to illustrate continuous
(and ideally reflective) interaction within and across space and time. The
traversing of space and time allows for (and may even necessitate) alter-
ations in both society and the individual. The respondent above knew
something, from some social source (newspaper, television, radio, the Web)
about the Danish controversy but wanted to learn more. The knowledge
enabled this person to construct a search in which the likelihood of re-
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trieving something relevant was high. Additionally, the student connects
the outcomes of the controversy (threats, demonstrations, accusations)
with the nature of the cartoons, thereby acknowledging the reflection that
is needed for understanding.
Bhaskar also expresses precisely what he means by dialectic: “In its most
general sense, dialectic has come to signify any more or less intricate pro-
cess of conceptual or social (and sometimes even natural) conflict, inter-
connection and change, in which the generation, interpenetration and
class of oppositions, leading to their transcendence in a fuller or more
adequate mode of thought of form of life (or being), plays a key role” [7,
p. 3]. The modes of dialectic are related to phenomenology; they include
parts and wholes, presence and absence, and what Sokolowski refers to as
“identity in manifolds” [12, pp. 27–33]. Identity in manifold is exemplified
by the need for perception from multiple standpoints or perspectives in
order to apprehend a complete thing (a cube, for example) as it is given.
The matter of addressing identity in manifolds is also clear in some of the
respondents’ reports. One of these reports serves to represent the attempt
to come to grips, dialectically, with anything that includes multiple per-
spectives:
I chose this particular article because it was the only result that appeared under
the terms I searched under [in a particular database]. It also happened to address
the assigned topic toward the college campus, which reflects my interest in the
academic library.
I wanted to find an article that would discuss the first amendment in a more
active manner, rather than passively discuss the “theory” of what the first amend-
ment could mean. The article struck me as particularly interesting because it dealt
with issues of censorship demanded by librarians, rather than the presupposed
stance of opposition of material by the community.
I chose the particular result because it seems to present a good example of an
article discussing the ramifications that could occur in the digital age and the
problems of overcommercializing of the internet and use in a library setting.
The responses illustrate an intentionality that is present at the point of
asking the questions and beginning the search. The student frames the
issue in a particular way so as to focus on a reality for herself/himself.
Among other things, this response demonstrates the adoption of what
can be called a phenomenological attitude toward retrieved information.
The phenomenological attitude is an exercise in dialectics as Bhaskar
speaks of it. The respondent refers to oppositions in the way that freedom
of information can be thought of and in the ways freedom is applied. This
respondent eschews the taken-for-granted and follows Bhaskar’s advice to
“revise our descriptive, taxonomic and explanatory vocabularies in the light
of unexpected, and possibly recursive, epistemic and/or ontic change” [7,
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p. 12]. In dialectical critical realism knowledge is not fixed, cannot be
reified. For information seeking the implication is that one’s process of
knowing is not completed by any instrumental acts (such as searching a
database). It was mentioned above that one illustration of critical realism
is the act of reassessing a document both in light of changing contexts
(over time, for instance) and of becoming aware of other documents. This
aspect of critical realism is represented very clearly in the respondent’s
report; no single document (and, by extension, no single statement, image,
or claim) is sufficient, given the dialectical nature of knowledge growth.
This finding cannot be overemphasized; it carries import for any future
research in information seeking and also education in information studies.
Discussion
The assignment described here is only one possible application of phe-
nomenological critical realism (PCR). The direct interactions between pro-
fessionals and information seekers and students could provide many op-
portunities for inquiry. At the very outset there is the formal/structural
element of the library as an institution. Within that institution there is
praxis that is carried out in specific ways. One question that arises relates
to the extent to which there is an acceptance of the information seeker/
student as “other.” The forms, attitudes, and outcomes of interactions can
be examined. Further, the structural aspects of the queries that are made
could be a component of the inquiry. Those aspects are shaped in large
part by the nature of the structure, including, among other things, political,
economic, social, and associational natures. The nature of the structure
might be taken for granted, but phenomenological critical realism insists
that it be explicit, so that the fullest meaning can be found. For example,
if the institution examined is the public library, there is a capitalist structure
that is grounded in taxation; the structure contributes materially (ontolog-
ically) to the Being of the public library. All services, collections, access, and
interactions between staff and community will be affected by that structure.
The four planes that Bhaskar illustrates are connected to the later ideas of
Husserl in that there is necessary intersubjectivity, there is reflection on self
and other, and there is ontological being manifest through action.
Other kinds of investigation can delve into the existence of libraries
themselves. As institutions they do have particular Being and also particular
situatedness. That is, the library exists within a context: (1) an academic
library exists because of the college or university; it has no purpose apart
from that context; (2) a public library exists for the community; its existence
is not as fixed as that of an academic library, but it still is situated within
the community. There will be inevitable governance relationships between
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the library and the larger institution in which it is located. The common
locution “parent organization” carries import that begs for phenomeno-
logical examination. More than the rhetorical, the relationship between
library and parent is manifest through action. The action has real com-
ponents—a budget, personnel, policies, a board, and so on. The totality
of the structure constitutes a whole composed of parts. The composition
of the whole, however, is not self-evident from some device like an orga-
nizational chart; interaction is more fluid, and the dialectic is less evident
than a chart can illustrate. As Bhaskar says, “if we leave out social structures,
or if we only have social structures and we leave out nature or inter-personal
relations, then we are in a situation of absence, dialectically erroneous
absence” [18, p. 74].
There may be an urge in LIS to seek predictive means of inquiry [19],
but that quest may well be quixotic. The phenomenological realist ap-
proach takes its cue from Bhaskar, though: “Criteria for the rational de-
velopment and replacement of theories in social science must be explan-
atory and non-predictive” [6, pp. 45–46], because of the open-systems
nature of social action. With the emphasis on explanation comes a reali-
zation that, while social action is characterized by flows, the flows are as
abrupt, diverse, and turbulent as are the open systems themselves. Predic-
tion would have to rely on a very different structure. Archer points out
clearly that the idea of “unbroken flows would mean a continuity of social
groups, membership in the groups, the influences of structure, and the
behavior of people in social structures; all of those assumptions are ques-
tionable” [20, pp. 72–74]. When it comes to explanation, however, the
phenomenological realist approach presents an opportunity to inquire into
ontological reality while parsing epistemological conclusions with a falli-
bilist orientation. Among the many implications of the emphasis on ex-
planation is the practice and theory of classification. This is an integral
element of LIS in at least two ways: it is one aspect of the field to provide
categorizations of informative objects so that organizational systems can
be created, and it is an area of inquiry inasmuch as researchers examine
systems of classification and the ways that people themselves categorize
informative objects. Bhaskar offers an important observation on the nature
and use of classification: “To classify a thing in a particular way in science
is to commit oneself to a certain line of inquiry. Ex ante there will be as
many possible lines of inquiry as manifest properties of a thing, but not
all will be equally promising” [5, p. 210]. An important—perhaps the most
important—aspect of the phenomenological realist approach is that clas-
sification is a product of a process that enables the emergence of properties
(including the properties of thought and action, as well as of objects). For
this, and the reasons described throughout this article, this method holds
enormous promise for LIS.
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Perhaps most important for LIS, phenomenological critical realism is a
sound and practically applicable means of avoiding the trap of positivist
or objectivist inquiry. It intentionally includes intersubjectivity and Being,
while insisting that ontology obtains. Alva Noe¨, while not addressing PCR
directly, refutes a reductively materialist conception of Being: “It does not
seem to us perceivers as if the brain builds up an internal model of the
world; rather, it seems to us as if the world is here and we are here in it.
. . . What guarantees [the world’s] availability is, first of all, its actually
being here, and second, my possessing the skills needed to gain access to
it” [21, p. 140].
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